Fr. Peter Ryan, SJ is the Blessed Michael J. McGivney Chair in Life Ethics at Sacred Heart Major Seminary and served as executive director of the Secretariat of Doctrine and Canonical Affairs of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops from 2013 to 2016.
Since the publication of Amoris Laetitia nine years ago, faithful Catholics from all quarters of the Church have expressed concern about the confusion that has followed the Exhortation’s eighth chapter (AL8).
We share that concern and have explained why in our recent essay The Doctrinal Implications of Amoris Laetitia’s Chapter Eight.”
We did not delve into this matter lightly and certainly don’t want to make it harder for the faithful to trust magisterial teachings. But because the salvation of many souls is at stake, we are convinced that it would ill serve the Church to ignore this sincere concern. We wish to be of assistance to the numerous validly married Catholics—tens of thousands of active Catholics around the world—who are in a second union involving sexual activity that they are strongly tempted to regard as acceptable in God’s sight.
Is our concern misplaced?
We said we would welcome a response that could show us that our concern is misplaced, and we are grateful to Pedro Gabriel (PG) for attempting to do just that. Unfortunately, however, his attempt fails to reassure us. Indeed, since his best arguments fall so far short of the rebuttal that he claims them to be, his response only intensifies our concern. And while he says the problem is not with the ambiguity of the document itself but with articles like ours that read ambiguity into it, his efforts to substantiate that claim miss the mark entirely.
Before we reply to PG’s central arguments, we would like briefly to address his titular claim that we are “Stuck in 2017.” If we are stuck anywhere, it is in 2016, the year the document was published, raising the sincere and serious concerns of so many faithful Catholics—concerns to which AL’s defenders have yet to offer a satisfying reply. Those concerns don’t go away with the mere passage of time. In fact, because of the confusion and harm caused by the failure to address them over the past decade, those concerns have only increased.
AL8 teaches that in some cases a person bound by a valid marital bond who lives more coniugale (in a marital way) with someone other than his or her valid spouse may receive and so be admitted to Holy Communion without resolving to cease living more conjugal.
Our essay raises the concern that this teaching seems to implicitly contradict at least one of the following revealed truths: (1) no one should receive the Eucharist without being willing to conform his or her life to the objective demands of the Gospel; (2) a consummated Christian marriage is absolutely indissoluble; (3) for a married person to have sex with someone other than his or her valid spouse is always adulterous; or (4) adultery is always gravely wrong.
Holy Communion and mitigated responsibility
Almost all of PG’s arguments share the same assumption about what constitutes proper pastoral care for some who wish to receive the Eucharist without resolving to avoid extramarital sexual activity. That assumption is that although they do what is objectively gravely wrong even after being properly accompanied, they should be admitted to the Eucharist because the priest can have “moral security” that they are not subjectively culpable of mortal sin. PG says that Francis means to apply his novel permissions to this precise population: “the cohort that Francis has in mind is precisely those who are ‘invincibly ignorant or incapable of exercising their free will.’” They receive the Eucharist, “not as a ‘prize,’ but as ‘medicine and nourishment.’” The teaching of AL8, then, or so PG argues, is for “sacramental grace to be received precisely by those who will most benefit from it (especially taking into consideration that they are not in mortal sin)” (emphasis added).
PG claims that we exhibit a faulty conception of mitigated responsibility: “The problem is that Brugger and Ryan (alongside most of the critics of Amoris Laetitia) have an overly restrictive interpretation of what constitutes ‘invincibly ignorant or incapable of exercising their free will.’” Our response will make it clear that our understanding of mitigated responsibility is by no means overly restrictive.
We fully acknowledge that inculpability for gravely wrongful behavior, including adultery, is possible and that it occurs when a person lacks sufficient reflection or deliberate consent, or both. And we are well aware of the Catechism’s teaching, quoted by PG, that “the promptings of feelings and passions … external pressures or pathological disorders” can diminish or nullify culpability, as can duress, fear, irresistible habit, hostility, anger, desire, severe sadness or other disorders of the will (CCC 1860; also see 1735).
Indeed, our essay pointed out that AL8 makes statements to the effect that concrete factors can mitigate moral responsibility, that culpability is not the same in all cases, and that concrete circumstances should be taken into consideration when assessing whether these couples are free to receive the Eucharist.
But these statements do not erase the document’s persistent ambiguous suggestion that some who are not invincibly ignorant or morally incapacitated may receive the Eucharist.
Since the question of who may rightly receive the Eucharist has such importance concerning the salvation of souls, one would expect the document to remove all ambiguity about this matter. One would think that it would state, or at least imply, that Eucharistic communion is reserved only for those who do not meet the subjective conditions, properly understood, for mortal sin. But far from stating or even implying this, the document seems to suggest the opposite.
Proper accompaniment ordinarily ensures sufficient reflection
Referring to divorced and remarried individuals living more coniugale, AL8 states that priests should help them “to understand their situation according to the teaching of the Church.” The text continues:
Conversation with the priest, in the internal forum, contributes to the formation of a correct judgment on what hinders the possibility of a fuller participation in the life of the Church.… This discernment can never prescind from the Gospel demands of truth and charity, as proposed by the Church.
PG believes that through this conversation with the priest—what PG calls “a personal and pastoral discernment”—the priest can achieve “‘moral security’ that the [accompanied] person is not in mortal sin.” We think this confidence is dangerously mistaken.
If priests are determined to correctly form these people’s consciences on what hinders their ecclesial participation, they will certainly speak about what AL8 itself admits is these people’s “objective situation of sin.” Pastors must take seriously the document’s admonition to “never prescind from the Gospel demands of truth and charity, as proposed by the Church.” Indeed, AL8 teaches that “every effort should be made to encourage the development of an enlightened conscience.”
But if pastors follow this instruction and patiently explain the serious discrepancy between people’s “objective situation of sin” and the Gospel’s demands, one wonders: how can pastors achieve “security” that those they accompany are unable to recognize that they are morally obliged to conform their lives to the Gospel before they can rightly receive the Eucharist?
We argued that if the pastor’s effort is guided by the Gospel and the teachings of the Church, then it is reasonable to presume that sufficient reflection will ordinarily be achieved in those they accompany. What basis is there for denying that this will ordinarily be the case? To say that properly accompanied individuals will not ordinarily be capable of grasping the principles of the moral law bearing on adultery condescendingly implies a low estimation of the intelligence of the faithful.
Silence and ambiguity
AL8 could have precluded confusion by setting out the traditional teaching about what is required of these individuals after they have undertaken proper conscience formation (which the document itself enjoins): before receiving the Eucharist, these individuals should first be reconciled in the sacrament of Penance. This requires “repenting of having broken the sign of the Covenant and of fidelity to Christ,” and being “sincerely ready to undertake a way of life that is no longer in contradiction to the indissolubility of marriage” (John Paul II, Familiaris consortio 84). But AL8 says nothing of the sort, and its silence on this point makes it easy for those who have achieved sufficient reflection to convince themselves that they are doing nothing wrong in living more coniugale. Is there no ambiguity here? We think there is.
PG also disputes our claim that in omitting the teaching that cohabitating couples should adopt perfect continence before receiving the Eucharist, AL8 ambiguously suggests this is not an objective moral requirement.
But we have good reason for making this claim. AL8 states that “the Church acknowledges situations where, for serious reasons, such as the children’s upbringing, a man and woman cannot satisfy the obligation to separate” (subquote from FC 84). But unlike John Paul II, AL8 says nothing further about how couples who have made such a decision should conduct themselves concerning their sexual relationship. John Paul’s full quote reads:
This means, in practice, that when, for serious reasons, such as for example the children’s upbringing, a man and a woman cannot satisfy the obligation to separate, they “take on themselves the duty to live in complete continence, that is, by abstinence from the acts proper to married couples” [emphasis added].
Why does AL8 exclude the italicized statement? Might not readers understandably conclude that some unmarried couples are not obliged to live in complete continence? Is there no ambiguity here? Again, we think there is.
As if this were not ambiguous enough, AL8 appends footnote 329:
In such situations, many people, knowing and accepting the possibility of living “as brothers and sisters” which the Church offers them, point out that if certain expressions of intimacy are lacking, “it often happens that faithfulness is endangered and the good of the children suffers.”
The reference to “accepting the possibility” is unclear. Does it mean that they accept the requirement to live as brother and sister? Or does it mean that they recognize they can do so, but because of bad consequences, they might not adopt that possibility?
Commenting on this note, PG writes: “It must be pointed out, Francis is not necessarily validating this idea, but simply exposing the fact that many people, who accepted the possibility of living ‘as brother and sister,’ pointed out this problem.” Fair enough. We need not assume that Francis is “necessarily” endorsing anyone’s decision not to adopt perfect continence. But he also does not teach here or even suggest that failing to live as brother and sister would be objectively adulterous and endanger their salvation. So, the quotation leaves the ambiguous suggestion that if the consequences are serious enough, adulterous intimacy may sometimes be justified. We are mystified by the suggestion that passages like these do not leave the reader in doubt about this crucial matter.
To judge whether someone living more coniugale is culpable, we must further consider whether the person has sufficient reflection that doing so is gravely wrong, and also consider whether he or she gives deliberate consent. We shall deal with each in turn.
Insufficient reflection due to persistent, intense emotion?
One might ask whether what we said above deals with all potential cases of insufficient reflection. Isn’t it the case that passions such as fear, hostility, anger, desire, and severe sadness can compromise sufficient reflection? Aquinas acknowledges that people under the influence of passions can act contrary to their knowledge (see S.t., 1-2, q. 77, a. 2c.). If vehement emotions distract these persons from their awareness of the grave wrongness of what they are doing when they engage in objectively adulterous behavior, then even if they choose that behavior, they would not have sufficient reflection for mortal sin.
Does this basis for insufficient reflection—that of being afflicted by persistent intense emotion—plausibly describe the situation of couples who choose to continue to live more coniugale even after proper accompaniment by a priest?
We deny that this is a credible reading of AL8. The text never frames the persons under consideration as suffering from a persistent state of vehement passion. It considers people who, after engaging in a measured and conscience-enlightening process of priestly accompaniment, decide to remain in their objectively adulterous relationships; they intend to continue living more coniugale. Their decision may be difficult. They may feel between a rock and a hard place. They may even feel great distress. But none of this suggests that they are living in an enduring heat-of-passion state that prevents them, over time, from exercising calm deliberation, attending to their awareness of the grave wrongness of remaining in such a relationship, and resolving to extricate themselves from it.
Insufficient reflection despite proper accompaniment?
But might it not be the case that some people will simply be unable to grasp the truth that extra-marital sexual activity is gravely wrong even in their difficult circumstances?
Although it is ordinarily the case that properly accompanied people will realize that sexual activity outside of their true marriage is a grave matter, some may be unable to grasp this truth. Such people will, of course, realize that this is what the Church teaches—they will realize that mortal sin is the label the Church puts on such sexual activity. But they may feel that under their difficult circumstances, living more coniugale is not wrong for them because they understand neither (a) what it is that makes this sexual activity be a grave matter, nor (b) that they are obliged to avoid engaging in it even if they don’t understand why it is gravely wrong because being Catholic means accepting the truth that the Church’s definitive teaching is inspired by the Holy Spirit.
People in really difficult situations sometimes honestly come to the erroneous conclusion that doing what the Church identifies as a mortal sin is the best moral response available to them. If so, they do not have an adequate grasp that this is mortally sinful. When they consider the alternative, it can seem to them that doing what looks like a mortal sin is the best they can do. If that is really what is going on in their minds—if the alternative does strike them as morally worse—then even if they make the wrong choice when grave matter is involved, they are not committing a mortal sin. They do not have sufficient reflection.
However, the process of accompaniment proposed by AL8 itself plainly rules this out in most cases. The priest’s job is to help the person form “an enlightened conscience” about what hinders the possibility of a fuller participation in the life of the Church. Since the hindrance to that fuller participation is the person’s living more coniugale, the priest is charged to help the person understand why that is so—why engaging in intimate relations with someone other than one’s true spouse is an obstacle to enjoying intimacy with Jesus in the Eucharist. As AL8 points out, the priest’s counsel “can never prescind from the Gospel demands of truth and charity, as proposed by the Church.”
These considerations, along with the realization that people are easily inclined to rationalize what they know to be illicit sexual activity, make it clear that this state of mind, though not impossible, will be rare for people who have been properly accompanied.
Inculpability due to incapacity for deliberate consent?
Might it be the case that while these people do not lack sufficient reflection, they are not culpable because they are incapable of deliberate consent?
We certainly acknowledge, with the Catechism and Aquinas, that the violence of coercion and/or the influence of severe mental illness can render a person’s behavior, including objectively adulterous behavior, involuntary (see CCC 1735, 1860; S.t., 1–2, q. 6, a. 5; a. 7, ad 3). But it is obvious that most of the people being accompanied do not fall into those categories. Then too, as noted above in our consideration of sufficient reflection, there is no reason to think that those being accompanied are living in an enduring heat-of-passion state that prevents them over time from exercising calm deliberation, attending to their awareness of the grave wrongness of remaining in such a relationship, and resolving to extricate themselves from it.
Indeed, the fact that AL8 itself never states or even implies that the divorced and remarried who are permitted to receive the Eucharist are to any significant extent drawn from the extremely narrow cohort of those who are incapable of deliberate consent makes it clear that such an interpretation is not credible.
Holy Communion for those who reject the Church’s teaching?
But even if people who wish to receive Holy Communion without resolving to conform their lives to the objective demands of the Gospel are in good faith, this does not make them apt candidates for receiving the Eucharist, for insofar as they reject the Church’s teaching on this matter, they place themselves outside the Church. God is not limited to the sacraments and can, of course, give them grace in other ways, and we should pray that they receive grace. Indeed, we should pray that they receive the grace to recognize that the Church’s teaching about the requirement to conform their lives to the objective demands of the Gospel is inspired by the Holy Spirit and binding on their consciences.
But as long as they reject that teaching, they should not receive the Eucharist, which expresses the unity of faith of the members of the Body of Christ.
Holy Communion for people culpable of mortal sin?
Just before his “Conclusion,” PG asks whether sinners with diminished culpability should receive the Eucharist, and he responds, “If they are not in mortal sin, yes, they really should.” He then asks, “But what if they are caught in a situation of sin?” Although that expression is not very precise, it is important to notice that he asks this question only after having dealt with sinners who are not culpable of mortal sin. It therefore seems clear that he is dealing with a new category, namely, people who are culpable of mortal sin.
He answers that question in the affirmative and with great confidence: “Even then, they should commune all the more.” This claim contradicts his understanding of the teaching of AL, for he calls it a misinterpretation to say “[t]hat Amoris Laetitia Allows Communion to Impenitent Sinners.” Yet here he says, “They can only begin their journey back to the faith with the help of sacramental grace.” But why should we think that people who are culpable of grave sin receive sacramental grace by receiving the Eucharist if they are unwilling to confess that sin in the Sacrament of Penance with the resolution to avoid it in the future?
Perhaps PG does not mean that people subjectively guilty of mortal sin and unwilling to repent should “commune all the more,” for he does not suggest such a view elsewhere. Nevertheless, his treatment of the matter leaves the reader wondering: Does he really mean what he seems to be saying—that unrepentant mortal sinners should receive the Eucharist? Would they not be doing precisely what St. Paul, out of deep concern for the salvation of souls, strongly warns against, namely, eating and drinking to their own condemnation (see 1 Cor 11: 27–29)?